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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
:

Case No. 20010205-CA

:

Priority No. 2

vs.
ERIC PINO,
Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the warrantless search of Pino's bag constituted an illegal search that was

not justified under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,
§ 14 of the Utah Constitution? Specifically, Pino argues that his consent to search the
bag was not valid because it was not attenuated from the officer's exploitation of an
illegal seizure. Nor was the search justified under an "officer safety" exception to the
Fourth Amendment protections against such unreasonable searches and seizures.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, the trial court's factual findings
are reviewed for clear error while its legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness.
State v Palmer, 803 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990). Likewise, the trial court's
ultimate decision that the consent was voluntary or involuntary is also reviewed for
correctness. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993).
1

This issue was preserved in a motion to suppress, a suppression hearing, and at
trial (R. 40-49, 66-67, 127, 129 at 49-50).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Eric Pino appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the Fourth

District Court after he was convicted by a jury of possession of methamphetamine in a
drug-free zone, a second degree felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Eric Pino was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or about

June 30, 1999, with Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug-Free Zone, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (R. 1). An
amended information which changed the date of the offense was filed on December 2,
1999 (R. 21).
On February 14, 2000, a preliminary hearing was held before the Honorable Lynn
W. Davis at which time Pino was bound over for trial on the charges upon a finding of
probable cause (R. 30-31, 126). In addition, Pino was arraigned and a plea of "not
guilty" was entered (R. 126 at 38).
On March 27, 2000, Pino filed a Motion to Suppress requesting the suppression of
evidence on grounds that it was obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution (R. 40-49). On
2

August 7, 2000, a suppression hearing .was Jield and Pino's motion was denied by Judge
Davis (R. 66-67, 127 at 27-28). Pino renewed the motion to suppress at the begginning
of trial and the motion was again denied (R. 129 at 49-50).
On November 16, 2000, a jury trial was held with Judge Davis presiding (R. 8284, 129) and Pino was convicted by the jury as charged (R. 104).
On February 5, 2001, Judge Davis sentenced Pino to thirty-six months probation
and ordered him to complete the substance abuse program at First Step House (R. 110-12,
128).
On February 28, 2001, Pino filed a Notice of Appeal in Fourth District Court (R.
119).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On May 19, 1999, Provo City Police Officer Ron Hughes was on day shift patrol
(R. 129 at 65). At approximately 1:30-2:00 p.m. Hughes spotted a vehicle driven by Pino
(R. 129 at 66). Based on a hunch, Hughes ran a computer check on the vehicle which
showed an expired registration—although the license plate showed a current registration
decal (R. 129 at 67, 79). Hughes followed Pino into a lot behind the Greyhound Bus
Depot in Provo, pulled directly behind Pino, got out of his car, and approached Pinowho was still seated alone in his vehicle, a 1982 Chevy (R. 129 at 67-68). Pino was
effectively boxed in because of a cement blockade in front of his vehicle (R. 129 at 79).
Hughes asked Pino for his drivers license, car registration and proof of insurance
on the vehicle (R. 129 at 68, 79). Pino gave Hughes a Utah I.D. card and said that he did
not have a drivers license and had recently purchased the vehicle but had not yet
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registered it in his name nor obtained insurance (R. 129 at 68). Hughes returned to his
vehicle to prepare a written citation and vehicle impound form (R. 129 at 69-70).
While Hughes was in his vehicle preparing the citation, Mark Robinson, another
Provo City officer, voluntarily responded to the location (R. 129 at 88-89). Robinson
testified that he would take his directions from Hughes, who was the primary officer, and
that he was there to provide backup for reasons of officer safety (R. 129 at 89). Robinson
approached Pino, who was seated in the driver's seat, and spoke with him (R. 129 at 8990).
Robinson said that he recognized Pino and knew him from numerous prior
meetings (R. 129 at 89; R. 127 at 6). Robinson testified that while he was working with
the Utah County Narcotics Task Force a few years ago he served two separate search
warrants on Pino's residence for methamphetamine (R. 126 at 25; R. 127 at 6). Drugrelated items were found in the home during the searches (R. 126 at 25).
During the execution of the second search warrant, Robinson testified that he had
a conversation with Pino on the telephone (R. 126 at 25). Pino was not present at the
home but called while the officers were there and Robinson answered the phone (Id.).
Pino was upset about the warrant and "made threats" to kill all of the officers present at
the execution including Robinson if they did not "get out of [his] house" (R. 126 at 26;
R. 127 at 8, 13). This conversation took place at the end of 1997 or beginning of 1998
when Robinson worked with the narcotics task force (R. 127 at 10-11). Robinson had no
contact with Pino between the phone conversation and the traffic stop approximately 1518 months later (R. 127 at 14).
Robinson testified that because of the previous threat made by Pino, he was
concerned about officer safety during the traffic stop (R. 126 at 26). Robinson testified
4

that Pino was extremely "mellow", "sedate" and "calm" which caused him to suspect that
Pino was under the influence of narcotics or paint fumes as Pino worked as a painter (R.
126 at 36; R. 127 at 16). While Hughes was working on the citation and vehicle
impound, Robinson maintained contact with Pino (R. 126 at 27).
As Robinson spoke with him, Pino voluntarily exited the vehicle and the two
continued to converse next to the car (R. 126 at 33). During the conversation, Robinson
asked Pino if he was still "involved in the use or distribution of methamphetamine" (R.
126 at 28). Pino denied any current drug involvement (Id.).
While Robinson spoke with Pino, Hughes continued to complete the citation and
impound form—including a vehicle inspection and equipment check (R. 129 at 71-72).
Hughes testified that he gathered information from Pino for the traffic citation and vehicle
impound form while Pino sat in his vehicle (R. 126 at 16). Pino was informed that the
vehicle would be impounded and that he could take any personal property of value with
him (R. 129 at 72; R. 126 at 18-19). According to Hughes, it was in response to this
information that Pino exited the car and grabbed "a gym bag that was in the car beside
him" (R. 129 at 72). Hughes testified that he does approximately a hundred impounds a
year and that it was his standard practice to search the personal belongings people remove
from their vehicles if he has a suspicion of criminal acitivity (R. 129 at 81). Hughes
testified that he had no suspicion that the gym bag Pino removed from the vehicle
contained illegal contraband (R. 129 at 81-82).
At this point, Pino was not yet free to leave because all of the paperwork had not
been completed (R. 126 at 19). At some point, Pino was given the citation for failure to
register the vehicle, no insurance, and suspended driver's licence and was given a date to
appear in court (R. 129 at 80; 126 at 17-18).

The citation (Defendant's Exhibit #4) is
5

signed by Pino and has the time of citation listed as 1:55 p.m. A copy of the citation is
included in the Addenda. Pino was also given a vehicle impound report (Defendant's
Exhibit #5) which is also included in the Addenda. Hughes testified that after the paper
work was completed Pino was free to leave (R. 129 at 82).
Very close in time to when Pino was given the citation and impound report,
Robinson asked Pino for consent to search the bag he had removed from the car (R. 129
at 81). The bag was big enough to conceal a weapon (R, 127 at 18). Pino consented to
the search and small plastic baggies—one of which contained a white powder residuewere found by Robinson (R. 129 at 72-73, 91; R. 127 at 18). Based on the contents
found in the bag and probable cause of drug possession, Hughes then conducted a search
of Pino's person and two other baggies which contained a powdery substance were found
(R. 129 at 76, 82; R. 126 at 9-10, 22). The residue found in the plastic baggies tested
positive for methamphetamine at the State Crime Lab (R. 129 at 132). No weapons were
found in the bag or Pino's person (R. 127 at 18).
Pino was no cited for drug use at the time of the traffic stop nor was he arrested on
any charges (R. 126 at 36).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Pino asserts that the search of his constituted an illegal and unjustifiable search
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, §14 of the
Utah Constitution and the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence
obtained as a result of the search. Specifically, Pino asserts the following: One, that the
continued detention of Pino while he was asked to consent to the search of his bag
exceeded the scope of any permissible detention and was unsupported by reasonable
6

sjispicioo of criminal activity that was independent of the initial detainer. Two that
Pino's consent to the search of his bag was not voluntary nor was it attenuated from the
illegal detention. Three, that the trial court erred m its conclusion that the search of
Pino's bag was justified under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's
protections. Finally, Pino asserts that the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion that there
was no Fourth Amendment violation which required suppression of the evidence obtained
from the continued detention of Pino and the search of his bag and his person is incorrect
and requires reversal by this Court.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PINO'S BAG CONSTITUTED
AN ILLEGAL SEARCH THAT CANNOT BE JUSTIFIED
UNDER AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S
PROHIBITION AGAINST SUCH SEARCHES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 14 of the
Utah Constitution guarantee individuals the right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures. "Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure5
within the meaning of [the Fourth and Fourteenth] Amendments...." State v. Case, 884
P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99
S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979)). While an individual has "a lesser expectation of privacy in a
car than in his or her home, one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment
while in a vehicle." State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). Nevertheless,
it is this lessor expectation of privacy that has resulted in an/'automobile exception" to
the warrant rule which allows officers the ability to "temporarily detain a vehicle and its
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occupants upon reasonable suspicion of criminal activity for the purposes of condufeting^alimited investigation of the suspicion." State v. James, 2000 UT 80 at ^[10, 13 P.3d 576.
In reviewing the legality of a traffic stop this Court must consider two questions:
"[W]hether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the
first place." State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah App. 1996) (quoting Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed. 889 (1968)). The inquiry as to the
first question focuses on whether the stop was "incident to a traffic violation committed
in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1991). Pino
concedes that Hughes was constitutionally justified in initiating stopping his vehicle for
investigation of an expired registration.
The focus of the second question is "whether the stop was reasonably related in
scope to the traffic violation which justified it in the first place." State v. Hansen, 2000
UT App 353 at Tf 11, 17 P.3d 1135, cert, granted, 26 P.3d 235 (Utah 2001) (citing
Patefield, 927 P.2d at 657). "Once a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'"
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (citation omitted). In addition both the
"length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761,
763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 20, 88 S.Ct. at 1868). Pino asserts that the
police exceeded the permissible scope of the detention and that any evidence obtained as
a result of the search of Pino's bag or his person must be suppressed because they were
obtained by an unlawful detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion or probable cause
of other criminal activity.
8

A.

The police exceeded the scope of any.permissible-detainer.
Once, the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated, the police were obligated to

release Pino from his detention and allow him "to proceed on his way, without being
subject to further delay by police for additional questioning." State v. Robinson, 797
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990) (citations omitted). Moreover, any "[i]nvestigative
questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of
more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific,
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer[s] at the
time of the stop." Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132.
Pino asserts that the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated when he signed and
received the citation for the traffic offenses and the vehicle impound report; and that he
should have been allowed "to proceed on his way without being subject to further delay"
by the officers for additional investigative questioning. This proposition is supported by
the testimony of Officer Hughes that Pino, in his mind, would be free to leave once the
paperwork was completed (R. 129 at 82).
However, Pino continued to be detained and seized because the officers' conduct
failed to communicate to him—or any reasonable person—that he was free to decline their
requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244
(Utah 1994). One, neither officer actually informed Pino that he was free to leave. Two,
in almost immediate proximity to Pino's receipt of the citation and impound report he
was questioned by Robinson about consent to search his bag R. 129 at 81). Three, this
request to search came on the heels of Robinson's investigative questioning of Pino
concerning his employment and past/present drug use (R. 129 at 89-90; R. 126 at 28, 33).

9

Accordingly, because Pino continued to be seized by.the officers, any additional
questioning by the officers subjected him to further delay and had to be supported by
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Pino asserts that Officer
Robinson's investigative question-which was asked "about the same time" Pino was
given the citation and impound report—and which sought consent to search Pino's bag
was unsupported by reasonable suspicion of other criminal activity (R. 129 at 81).
The fact that Pino had a prior history of drug narcotics is insufficient to signal a
current involvement in criminal activity. Nor does his "calm", "mellow" and "sedate"
demeanor establish that Pino was presently undertaking any criminal activity. Blood shot,
glazed eyes and a calm, cooperative behavior should not lead a reasonable officer to
suspect the influence of drugs. State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155 (Utah App. 1992)
(holding driver's evasive behavior when questioned, and blood shot eyes, did not provide
reasonable suspicion for detention exceeding scope of traffic stop). Moreover, Officer
Hughes testified that he had no suspicion that Pino was involved in criminal activity or
that his bag contained any illegal contraband (R. 129 at 81-82).
Accordingly, Pino asks that this Court find that the officers exceeded the scope of
any permissible detainer when they continued to detain and question Pino without
reasonable suspicion once the purpose of the initial stop was effectuated; and that all
evidence obtained as a result of this continued seizure must be suppressed.

B.

Pino's consent to the search of his bag was not voluntary was obtained by
police exploitation of a prior illegality.
A warrantless search is only permissible under the Fourth Amendment if the State

can establish that it falls within one of the "few specifically established and welldelineated exceptions." State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 687 (Utah 1990) (citation
10

omitted). One of said established exceptions is consent. Id. However, "[A] defendant's
consent to search following illegal police activity is valid under the Fourth Amendment
only if both of the following tests are met: (i) The consent was given voluntarily, and (ii)
the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality." Hansen, 2000
UT App 353 at % 18 (quoting Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1262). Pino asserts that his consent
to the search of his bag was not voluntary and that it was obtained by Officer Robinson's
"exploitation of a prior illegality." State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 440 (Utah App. 1996).
1.

Pino's consent was not voluntary.

In State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433 (Utah App. 1996), this Court adopted the following
analytical framework in order to determine whether the State had met its burden of
proving that consent was voluntarily given: One, there must be clear and positive
testimony that the consent was unequivocal and specific. Two, the consent must have
been given freely and intelligently and obtained without duress or coercion either express
or implied. Three, "every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights" must be indulged and there "must be convincing evidence that such
rights were waived." Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at ^[18 (quoting Ham, 910 P.2d at 439).
In making this determination this Court looks at "the totality of the circumstances." Id.
(citation omitted). In addition, the ultimate conclusion as to the voluntariness of the
consent is reviewed for correctness. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271.
Pino asserts that his consent to the search was not voluntary under the criteria
established in Ham. Pino concedes that there is positive testimony that his consent was
specific and unequivocal. However, Pino argues that the consent was not freely and
intelligently given nor was it given free of duress or coercion—express or implied. Pino's
case is very similar to Hansen and Ohio v. Robinette, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997).
11

In Hansen, the defendant was stopped for no insurance and an improper lane
change. After the officer warned Hansen of the insurance requirement and returned his
license and registration, he asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the
vehicle. After Hansen indicated that no such items were present in the vehicle, the officer
asked Hansen for permission to search the vehicle and Hansen consented. 2000 UT App
353 at Tf2, 4. In Robinette, the defendant was stopped for speeding for which he was
given a verbal warning before the officer returned his license. Immediately after the
return of the license, the officer asked the defendant about the presence of illegal
contraband in the car such as drugs or weapons. When the defendant denied the presence
of such items, the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle and the defendant
granted the request. 685 N.E.2d at 764. In this case, Pino was asked for consent to
search his bag almost contemporaneous to receiving the citation and vehicle impound
report (R. 129 at 81). Moreover, almost immediately prior to the request to search—just
prior to his receipt of the citation, Officer Robinson had questioned Pino about any
current involvement with narcotics (R. 126 at 27-28).
Pino urges this Court to follow Hansen and Robinette and conclude that "every
reasonable presumption" in this case weighs against the waiver of his fundamental
constitutional rights; and that the suspicious question concerning current drug
involvement asked by Officer Robinson near the time of his request to search combined
with the fact that the request to search and subsequent consent came just as Pino was
illegally detained after receiving the citation and impound report indicate that "the
circumstances surrounding the request to search made the search subtly coercive."
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 atfflf24-25. Accordingly, Pino requests that this Court
conclude that his consent to the search of his bag was not voluntary.
12

2.

Pino's consent to search was obtained through exploitation of illegal
police conduct.

Should this Court conclude that Pino's consent was voluntary, Pino asserts that his
consent is still not constitutionally valid because it was obtained through police
exploitation of prior misconduct. Pino has already established that his continued
detention once he was cited for the initial traffic violations exceeded the scope of any
constitutionally permissible detainer. "If voluntary consent follows police misconduct,
the State must establish 'the existence of intervening factors which prove that the consent
was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct. Ham, 910 P.2d at 440.
Factors this Court must examine in regards to this issue are: One, the temporal
proximity of the initial illegality and the consent in question. Two, the presence of
intervening circumstances. Three, the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal misconduct.
Ham, 910 P.2d at 440 (citations ommitted). Pino asserts that all of these factors weigh
against attenuation in this case.
One, the proximity between the illegal detention after he had been cited for the
traffic violations and his consent to search is very short. Almost contemporaneous to the
time Pino was given the citation and impound report and should have been free to leave,
Robinson continued his detention of Pino and asked him for consent to search the bag he
had removed from the car (R. 129 at 81).
Two, like the facts in Ham, there were "absolutely no intervening" circumstances
between the illegal detention and the consent. 910 P.2d at 441.
Three, Pino asserts that the purpose of the continued illegal detention—and the
purpose of Robinson's desire to search the bag-was an obvious attempt to find evidence
that Pino was still involved in narcotics use without any reasonable suspicion or probable
cause. Officer Robinson at preliminary hearing testified that immediately prior to Pino's
13

removal of the bag from the car and his request to search, he had a conversation with
Pino "about whether or not he was still involved in the use or distribution of
methamphetamine" (R. 126 at 27-28). During the conversation Pino was "very sedate" so
Robinson was concerned that Pino could be under the influence of narcotics or paint
fumes (R. 126 at 28, 36; R. 127 at 16). Robinson also used such adjectives as "calm" and
"mellow" to describe Pino's demeanor during the detention (R. 126 at 36; R. 127 at 16).
Robinson testified that because of the threat made against him by Pino approximately 1518 months previous during a phone conversation when Pino was agitated and consent,
and more specifically, "because of the conversation [Robinson] had with him and his
stating he is no longer using or dealing, [Robinson] asked him if he minded if [Robinson]
looked in his black bag" (R. 126 at 28).1
Pino also asserts that Robinson's misconduct in continuing to detain him so that
consent could be obtained to search of his bag in order to find evidence of ding activity,
was flagrant. Robinson had no reasonable suspicion—let alone probable
cause—to suspect present criminal activity by Pino. The fact that Pino had a prior history
of drug narcotics is insufficient to signal a current involvement in criminal activity. Nor
does his "calm", "mellow" and "sedate" demeanor establish that Pino was presently
undertaking any criminal activity. Moreover, Officer Hughes testified that he had no
suspicion that Pino was involved in criminal activity or that his bag contained any illegal
contraband (R. 129 at 81-82).

^ino will address the issue of "officer safety" in the next section and demonstrate that
the trial court erred in finding that the search of his bag was justified under such an exception
to the Fourth Amendment's prohibitions against unreasonable searches and seizures?
14

Based upon these facts, Pino asks that this Court conclude that his consent was not
attenuated from the illegal detention and Officer Robinson's misconduct and that it
cannot be used by the State to validate the warrantless search of Pino5s bag.

C.

The trial court erred in concluding that the search of Pino's bag was justified
under an "officer safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment.
The trial court denied Pino's motion to suppress because he concluded that the

search of Pino's bag was justified for reasons of "officer safety" (R. 127 at 27-28).
Specifically, the trial court alluded to previous dealings between Robinson and Pino, a
prior threat made by Pino against Robinson, and the fact the Robinson believed that Pino
could have been under the influence of drugs because he was in "some sort of stupor" and
had a "glaze in his eyes" (R. 127 at 27). Pino asserts that the trial court erred in this
conclusion and that the search of his bag was not justified under the Fourth Amendment
pursuant to an "officer safety" exception.
Under the holding in Terry v. Ohio, and its progeny, a frisk or search for weapons
for officer safety following an investigatory stop is constitutionally permissible if: One, a
police officer observes unusual conduct which is interpreted in light of his experience as
an indication of possible criminal activity and present danger; and two, there is nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter which serves to dispel the officer's reasonable fear for
his own or other's safety. State v. White, 856 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884).
Pino asserts that Robinson's warrantless search of his bag was not supported by
"reasonable and articulable suspicion" that he was presently dangerous or that there were
*

weapons present. State v. Schlosser, 11A P.2d 1132, 1135, 1137-38 (Utah 1989).
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Accordingly, the search of his bag was not justified as under the "officer safety"
exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against warrantless searches.
One, "nothing about the nature of the underlying offense being investigated
prompted a conern for safety... [and] nothing [Pino] did, by way of conduct, attitude or
gesture, suggested the presence of a weapon." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454
(Utah 1996) (quoting Orme, J. dissenting in Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 732 (Utah App.
1992)). The underlying offenses consisted of three benign traffic violations. In addition,
Pino's demeanor was calm, mellow and sedate and not agitated, nervous or upset.
Two, the threat made by Pino against Robinson took place during a phone
conversation where Pino was very upset approximately 15-18 months prior to the stop (R.
127 at 10-11). Moreover, Robinson had no contact with Pino during the intervening
months (R. 127 at 14).
Three, if Robinson really feared for his safety because of the prior threat, he would
have immediately questioned Pino about the threat and the presence of weapons, or
would have immediately had Pino exit the car and conducted a Terry frisk. Instead,
Robinson conversed with Pino while he was seated in the vehicle, allowed Pino to exit
the vehicle without any frisk, and continued to converse with Pino outside the vehicle (R.
129 at 89-90; R. 126 at 33). Robinson never questioned Pino about weapons or the
threat. Robinson questioned Pino about narcotics involvement.
Four, Officer Hughes—who was the primary officer—did not testify as to any
officer safety concerns. To the contray, Hughes testified that he had no suspecion of Pino
carrying illegal contraband in the bag (R. 129 at 81-82). Furthermore, Pino removed the
bag from the car at the direction of Hughes (R. 129 at 72; R. 126 at 18-19).
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Robinson's warrantless search of Pino's bag was not supported by "reasonable and
articulable suspicion" that he was presently dangerous or that there were weapons
present. Schlosser, 11A P.2d at 1135, 1137-38. Pino asks that this Court correct the trial
court's conclusion that warrantless search of Pino's bag was justified under an "officer
safety" exception to the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against such searches.
Pino further asks that this Court order that all evidence obtained from the
warrantless search of Pino's bag-including the evidence obtained by Hughes' search of
Pino's person because of the narcotics found by Robinson during the search of the bagbe suppressed as fruits of a poisonous tree.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
For the foregoing reasons, Pino asks that this Court reverse his conviction of
possession of methamphetamine in a drug-free zone; and that the matter be remanded to
the Fourth District Court with instructions that the evidence is to be suppressed and the
matter dismissed as a matter of law.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7_ day of August, 2001.

Margaret ^/Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant
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vs.
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Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Defendant ERIC PINO, by
and through counsel, David Sturgill, Utah County Public Defenders Association, submits this
MOTION TO SUPPRESS and accompanying MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
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The Defendant, ERIC PINO, by and through his Attorney of record, David Sturgill, Utah
County Public Defenders Association, submits this MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS.
FACTS 1
1.

On May 19, 1999, Provo City police officer Ron Hughes stopped Mr. Pino's vehicle due
to a traffic violation—the vehicle's registration was expired. PHT, 7.

2.

Officer Hughes spoke to Mr. Pino and discovered that he was operating the vehicle
without a valid driver's license, and that the vehicle was uninsured. PHT, 8.

3.

Officer Hughes explained to Mr. Pino that although he would only receive a citation, his
vehicle would be impounded. He also informed Mr. Pino that he could "take anything of

The facts related in Defendant's Motion to Suppress were gathered from Defendant's preliminary
hearing conducted Februrary 14, 2000. Facts from the hearing are cited in the following manner: PHT
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript), page number.

value that [he wanted] with [him] out of the car." PHT, 18. Once Officer Hughes had
completed the citation, Mr. Pino began to gather items that he intended to leave with,
including a black gym bag. PHT, 17-18.
4.

Officer Robinson, also with Provo City, arrived to the scene shortly after the initial traffic
stop. Officer Robinson told Officer Hughes that "he knew [Mr. Pino] and knew that he
had a drug past." PHT, 9.

5.

Officer Robinson then approached Mr. Pino and "had a conversation about whether or not
[Mr. Pino] was still involved in the use or distribution of methamphetamine." PHT, 28.
Mr. Pino responded that he "had put all of that behind him and he was no longer doing
that" PHT, 28. That conversation lasted "three [or] four minutes." PHT, 33.

6.

Officer Robinson testified that during their conversation, he observed that Mr. Pino's
eyes were "glazed over and bloodshot." PHT, 35. Officer Robinson also testified that
Mr. Pino was sedate, calm and cooperative. PHT, 36. As a result, Officer Robinson
suspected Mr. Pino was under the influence of a controlled substance. Officer Robinson
did not, however, conduct any field sobriety tests to confirm or dispel that belief. PHT,
35.

7.

Officer Robinson then observed a black gym bag that Mr. Pino removed from his vehicle,
and "asked [Mr. Pino] if he minded if [he, Officer Robinson,] looked in [the] bag." PHT,
28. Mr. Pino allegedly consented and handed the bag to Officer Robinson. PHT, 28.
Inside the bag, Officer Robinson allegedly discovered several small baggies that appeared
to contain a controlled substance. PHT, 29.

8.

At that point, Officer Hughes asked Mr. Pino to empty his pockets. PHT, 10. Mr. Pino
allegedly "took out of his pocket a small fuse box and attempted to . . . drop it down the
2

back of his shirt, at which time [Officer Hughes] retrieved [it.]" PHT, 10. The fuse box
"contained a baggy with white powder." PHT, 10.
9.

Mr. Pino was then arrested for unlawful possession of a controlled substance and drug
paraphernalia.
ARGUMENT

I.

ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED AND STATEMENTS MADE BY DEFENDANT
INCIDENT TO HIS ARREST SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED UNDER ARTICLE I,
SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION AND THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
Article I, section 14 of Utah's constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United

States Constitution contain identical language; both provide:
The right of the people to be secure in their person, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated[.]
Although identical, these two provisions have not always been interpreted the same way. The
Utah Supreme Court recently determined that "[w]hile [our] interpretation of article I, section 14
has oflen paralleled the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the Fourth Amendment,
we have stated that we will not hesitate to give the Utah Constitution a different construction
where doing so will more appropriately protect the rights of this state's citizens." State v.
DeBooy, 388 Utah Adv. Rep. 12, 13, f 12 (2000).
Neither constitutional provision prohibits all seizures, but only unreasonable ones. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968); Also see State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 657 (Utah Ct. App.
1996). Under Terry, to determine whether a seizure is reasonable involves a two-pronged
analysis: (1) Whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2) Whether the
officer's action was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
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interference in the first place. Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20; accord State v. Robinson. 797 P.2d 431,
435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
As to the first prong, a police officer is constitutionally justified in stopping a vehicle if
the stop is "incident to a traffic violation committed in the officer's presence." State v. Talbot,
792 P.2d 972, 975 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). In the case at bar, Mr. Pino was originally detained
because his vehicle was not properly registered. Mr. Pino's initial detention appears to be
justified.
As to the second prong, "[t]he length and scope of the detention must be 'strictly tied to
and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.5" State v. Johnson,
805 P.2d 761, 763 (19919) (quoting Teiry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1968)) (emphasis added).
During a routine traffic stop, an officer may '"briefly detain the vehicle and its occupants while
he examines the vehicle registration and driver's license.'" State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763
(Utah 1991) (quoting State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989). The officer may also
conduct a computer check for outstanding warrants. See State v. Figueroa-Solorio, 830 P.2d 276,
280 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Once the purpose of the initial stop is effectuated, the detained
individuals must be allowed to proceed on their way, unless further investigation is "supported
by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,
435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In the present case, Officer Hughes discovered that Mr. Pino was driving without a valid
drivers license and insurance. It does not appear, however, that Officer Hughes suspected Mr.
Pino was engaged in any additional criminal activity. Officer Hughes informed Mr. Pino that he
would be cited for the traffic violations and allowed to leave; his vehicle, however, would be
impounded. Officer Hughes informed Mr. Pino that he could remove and take with him items
4
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from the vehicle he didn't want impounded. Officer Hughe's actions to this point were
reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified Mr. Pino's original and continued
detention.
Once Officer Hughes finished filling out the citation, Mr. Pino began to collect items he
intended to leave with, including a black gym bag. At that point, Officer Robinson arrived and
approached Mr. Pino. Officer Robinson discussed with Mr. Pino, for several minutes, "whether
or not he was still involved in the use or distribution of methamphetamine." PHT, 28. Mr. Pino
responded that he "had put all of that behind him and he was no longer doing that." PHT, 28.
Officer Robinson then observed the black bag Mr. Pino had removed from his vehicle and asked
Mr. Pino if he could search it
In State v. Ziegleman, 905 P.2d 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the court held that a similar
inquiry exceeded the scope of detention for a routine traffic stop. In Ziegleman, the defendant
was stopped by a Utah Highway Patrol Trooper due to speeding. The defendant provided the
trooper a valid drivers license but could not produce vehicle registration. The defendant
explained to the trooper that the vehicle belonged to a friend. The defendant eventually produced
insurance information that identified the vehicle's owner, which was confirmed by the trooper
through dispatch. Nevertheless, the trooper suspected the vehicle was stolen. The trooper then
asked whether any weapons or narcotics were in the vehicle, and after the suspect denied their
presence, requested consent to search. The defendant consented and a search of the suspect's
vehicle uncovered contraband. The court determined that, under the circumstances, the officer's
question concerning narcotics or weapons in the defendant's car was illegal because it extended
the length or duration of the detention beyond what was justified during a routine traffic stop.
See 905 P.2d at 887; See also United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding
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officer's continued detention of the defendant beyond the time required to receive Ihe
information needed to issue a speeding citation constituted an unreasonable seizure under the
Fourth Amendment).
In the case at bar, officer Robinson's actions not only lengthened the duration of Mr.
Pino's detention, they extended its scope. Article I, section 14 and the Fourth Amendment does
not simply limit the "length" or "duration" of a seizure, it limits the "scope" as well. See 805
P.2d at 763 (holding "length" and "scope" of Fourth Amendment seizure must be strictly tied to
and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible). Mr. Pino was
originally stopped due to a vehicle registration violation. Further inquiry revealed that Mr. Pino
had neither a valid drivers license, nor current insurance. However, once officer Hughes finished
filling out the citation for the various traffic violations, Mr. Pino should have been provided a
copy of the citation, and allowed to gather his things and leave. Instead, Officer Robinson
questioned Mr. Pino at length about whether he was still using or distributing drugs. What
should have been limited to a routine traffic stop and vehicle impound, turned into a fishing
expedition for drugs, unjustified by the circumstances that rendered Mr. Pino's detention
permissible.
The State will likely argue that the discovery of contraband in Mr. Pino's gym bag and on
his person was lawfully pursuant to Mr. Pino's consent. As in Ziegleman, however, Mr. Pino's
alleged consent to search was obtained through the exploitation of illegal questions concerning
contraband; questions that unjustifiably lengthened the duration and extended the scope of Mr.
Pino's detention. See 905 P.2d at 887 (holding "[although defendant's consent was voluntary m
fact, it was obtained through the exploitation of the trooper's illegal question of whether
defendant had any narcotics or weapons in his car"); See also State v. Harmon, 854 P.2d 1037,
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1040 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (holding search following a consent is invalid if consent was obtained
by police exploitation of the prior illegality). Consequently, the contraband discovered following
Mr. Pino's consent to search, and statements he made following his unlawful arrest must be
suppressed. See State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 472 (Utah 1990) (holding exclusion of illegally
obtained evidence is a necessary consequence of police violations of article I, section 14 of the
Utah Constitution).
The State might also attempt to justify officer Robinson's actions by arguing that he
suspected Mr. Pino was under the influence of drugs and/or was in possession of a dangerous
weapon. Any suspicion that Mr. Pino was engaged in criminal activity more serious than traffic
violations was unreasonable and did not justify lengthening and extending the scope of Mr.
Pino's detention. See State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (holding
further investigative detention "must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity"). Blood shot, glazed eyes and calm, cooperative behavior, without more,
would not lead a reasonable officer to suspect the influence of drugs. See State v. Lovegren, 829
P.2d 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (holding driver's evasive behavior when questioned, and blood
shot eyes did not provide reasonable suspicion for detention exceeding scope of traffic stop).
Furthermore, a search for weapons under Terry v. Ohio, is justified only when the
detaining officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that [a] suspect is armed and presently
dangerous." 392 U.S. at 21, 23 (emphasis added). Officer Robinson failed to articulate any facts
that would lead a reasonable officer to suspect Mr. Pino was then "presently" armed and
dangerous. In fact, throughout the police encounter, Mr. Pino was calm and cooperative; such
behavior should have dispelled any suspicion that Mr. Pino posed a threat.
CONCLUSION
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Officer Robinson's inquiry concerning Mr. Pmo's use or distribution of drugs both
lengthened the duration of his detention and extended its scope. Because the length and scope of
the detention was not strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible, and because it was not justified by any reasonable, articulable suspicion of
more serious criminal activity, Mr. Pino's continued detention was unreasonable under article I,
section 14 of Utah's constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, Mr. Pino's consent
to search was the result of police exploitation of a prior illegality, and therefore invalid. For the
foregoing reasons, the discovered contraband and statements made following Mr. Pino's arrest
must be suppressed.
Dated this <^<

day of March 2000.

V
David S. Sturgill
Counsel for Eric Pino
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